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The James–Lange theory considers emotional feelings as perceptions of physiological
body changes. This approach has recently resurfaced and modified in both neurosci-
entific and philosophical concepts of embodiment of emotional feelings. In addition to
the body, the role of the environment in emotional feeling needs to be considered.
I here claim that the environment has not merely an indirect and instrumental, i.e.,
modulatory role on emotional feelings via the body and its sensorimotor and vegeta-
tive functions. Instead, the environment may have a direct and non-instrumental, i.e.,
constitutional role in emotional feelings. This implies that the environment itself is con-
stitutive of emotional feeling rather than the bodily representation of the environment.
I call this the relational concept of emotional feeling. The present paper discusses
recent data from neuroimaging that investigate emotions in relation to interoceptive
processing and the brain’s intrinsic activity. These data show the intrinsic linkage of
interoceptive stimulus processing to both exteroceptive stimuli and the brain’s intrin-
sic activity. This is possible only if the differences between intrinsic activity and intero-
and exteroceptive stimuli is encoded into neural activity. Such relational coding makes
possible the assignment of subjective and affective features to the otherwise objec-
tive and non-affective stimulus. I therefore consider emotions to be intrinsically affec-
tive and subjective as it is manifest in emotional feelings. The relational approach thus
goes together with what may be described as neuro-phenomenal approach. Such neuro-
phenomenal approach does not only inform emotions and emotional feeling but is also
highly relevant to better understand the neuronal mechanisms underlying consciousness
in general.
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INTRODUCTION
The well-known James–Lange theory determined feelings as per-
ceptions of physiological body changes in the autonomic, hor-
monal, and motor systems. Once we become aware of phys-
iological bodily changes induced by danger, we feel fear and
subjectively experience emotional feelings. James (1884, p. 190)
consequently considered bodily changes as central to emo-
tional feelings; “we feel sorry because we cry, angry because
we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that we cry,
strike, or tremble, because we are sorry, angry, or fearful,
as the case may be.” Modern empirical versions of this the-
ory resurface in current neuroscientific models of emotion as,
for instance, in Damasio and others (Damasio, 1999, 2010;
Craig, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2009, 2011; Bechara, 2004; Niedenthal,
2007).
Conceptually, the embodied approach to emotion emphasizes
the crucial role of the body in emotional feeling. If the body
and its vegetative and sensorimotor function play a crucial role
in constituting emotional feelings, the body can no longer be con-
sidered in a merely objective way but rather as subjective and
experienced – the mere Koerper as objective body must be dis-
tinguished from the lived body as subjectively experienced body
in emotional feeling (Colombetti and Thompson, 2005, 2007;
Colombetti, 2008)1.
The emphasis on the body raises the question for the role of the
environment in constituting emotional feelings. The body stands
in direct contact with the environment via its sensorimotor func-
tions which are emphasized in recent body-based, e.g., embodied
concepts of emotional feelings (see Niedenthal et al., 2005; Nieden-
thal, 2007). The body is supposed to represent the environment in
sensorimotor terms and it is these bodily representations that are
considered crucial in constituting emotional feelings. The envi-
ronment may have then an indirect and modulatory role via the
body in the constitution of the emotional feelings.
One could also imagine that the environment has a direct and
constitutive role in emotional feeling; the environment may then
1It should also be pointed out that feelings cannot be considered to be conscious
perceptions of the neural activity in those brain regions that induce emotion as
for instance LeDoux assumes. We cannot become conscious of neural activity in
the first-order emotion regions (see also Bennett and Hacker, 2003, 208) since we
remain principally unable to perceive our brain’s neural activity as such which I
recently called “autoepistemic limitation” (Northoff, 2004; Northoff and Musholt,
2006, see chapter 1 and 2 in Northoff, 2011).
www.frontiersin.org August 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 303 | 1
Northoff Emotion and consciousness
directly constitute emotional feeling independent of the body’s
sensorimotor (and vegetative) functions. In this case, emotional
feelings should be constituted directly by the respective person’s
and its brain’s relation to the social environment (see below for def-
inition) rather than indirectly via bodily representations. Since the
person-environment relation is crucial here, I call such approach
the relational concept of emotional feeling (see Northoff, 2004 for
a general outline of such relational approach and Ben-Ze’ev, 1993
for the characterization of perception as relational).
The general aim of the present paper is to review recent human
imaging data on emotional feelings in relation to both intero-
ceptive processing and the brain’s intrinsic activity. This will be
accompanied by discussing the empirical and conceptual implica-
tions of these data which I assume to favor a relational approach
to emotions. Such relational concept characterizes emotions and
emotional feeling to be intrinsically affective and subjective. Neu-
ronally I assume this to be related to the interaction of the stimuli
with the brain’s intrinsic activity, i.e., rest-stimulus interaction (see
below for definition). Finally, the empirical and conceptual impli-
cations of such relational approach to emotions for consciousness
are pointed out.
EMPIRICAL DATA: INTEROCEPTION AND EMOTIONAL
FEELING
BRAIN IMAGING OF INTEROCEPTIVE AWARENESS
Recent imaging studies using fMRI investigated neural activity
during interoceptive stimulus processing like evocation of blood
pressure changes during isometric and mental tasks, heart beat
changes and perception, anticipatory skin conductance during
gambling, and heart rate modulation during presentation of emo-
tional faces (Critchley, 2005 for a review, Craig, 2002, 2003, 2004,
2009, 2011; Pollatos et al., 2007a,b). These studies observed neural
activity changes in the right insula, the anterior cingulate cortex
extending from supragenual to dorsal regions (SACC/DACC), and
the amygdala. This led to the assumption that specifically the right
insula and the SACC/DACC integrally represent autonomic and
visceral responses that are transferred from the spinal cord through
the midbrain, the hypothalamus, and the thalamocortical pathway
to the right insular cortex (Craig, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2009; Critch-
ley, 2005). Based on these results, these regions are assumed to be
involved in re-presenting the autonomic and visceral state of the
body and thus interoceptive processing. Craig (2002, 2003, 2004,
2009, 2010, 2011) assumes specifically the right insula to be cru-
cially involved which receives autonomic and visceral afferences
from lower centers (see above) and re-represents the interocep-
tive body state in an integrated way. This allows the insula to give
rise of a “mental image of one’s physical state” which, according
to Craig, provides the basis for subjective awareness of emotional
feeling and one’s self as “material me.”
See Figure A1 in Appendix for the different regions, and
Glossarium for the terms.
If these regions mediate interoceptive processing, the ques-
tion for their role in the subjective experience of bodily and
thus interoceptive changes as the basis for emotional feeling
arises. Critchley et al. (2004) led subjects evaluate whether the
own heart beat was synchronous or asynchronous with an audi-
tory feedback note which allowed to compare interoceptive- and
exteroceptive-directed attention. Interoceptive attention to the
own heartbeat increased activity in the right insula (and the
SACC/DACC and the somatomotor cortex) while exteroceptive
attention to the tone suppressed activity in the very same region.
Activity in the right insula also correlated with both the per-
formance in the heartbeat detection task and subjective anxiety
symptoms which also correlated with each other. These findings
suggest close relationship between interoceptive awareness and
emotional feeling.
Other studies demonstrated the modulation of these intero-
ceptive stimulus changes by exteroceptive stimuli. Using fMRI,
Critchley (2005), for instance, investigated regional neural activity
changes during presentation of happy, sad, angry, and disgusted
faces. They observed heart rate changes to be dependent upon the
emotional category with sad and angry faces inducing the strongest
heart rate changes. Emotional face-responsive regions like the
right (and left) insula, the SACC/DACC, the midbrain/brain stem,
and the right amygdala were also found to be correlating with
the changes in heart rate magnitude. These results indicate that
different emotions may be mediated by differential interoceptive
response patterns which may be mediated by neural activity in
the right insula, the SACC/DACC, the midbrain/brain stem, and
the amygdala. According to the authors themselves, these results
provide support for the hypothesis that interoceptive stimulus pro-
cessing may be involved in differentiating between different types
of emotional feelings.
The group around Pollatos conducted a series of studies
on heartbeat perception and emotional feeling. Pollatos et al.
(2007a) investigated attention toward heartbeats and cardiovas-
cular arousal; regions implicated in both conditions included the
right insula, the somatomotor cortex, the SACC/DACC, and the
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC). They observed activity
in the right insula and the DACC to be correlating with the degree
of interoceptive awareness while negative feelings correlated with
the BOLD response of the interoceptive awareness condition in the
DACC and DMPFC. Using EEG, they distinguished between good
and poor heartbeat perceivers. Good heartbeat perceivers (Pol-
latos et al., 2005, 2007a,b) showed higher arousal ratings as well as
higher P300 amplitudes and slow-wave latency ranges than poor
heartbeat perceivers during presentation of emotional pictures.
Taken together, these studies show behaviorally a close rela-
tionship between interoceptive awareness, arousal, and emotional
feeling. While neuroanatomically, they confirm the involvement of
the right insula, the SACC/DACC, and the DMPFC in mediating
the relationship between interoceptive awareness and emotional
feeling.
INTEROCEPTIVE AND EXTEROCEPTIVE AWARENESS
The question is whether the above described data support an
embodied concept of emotional feeling with exteroceptive stimuli
being merely modulatory and instrumental or epiphenomenal. Or
whether the data might be interpreted rather in favor of a relational
concept of feelings with interoceptive stimuli in relation to extero-
ceptive stimuli being constitutive and thus central. Presupposing
the James–Lange theory, most of the above cited authors have
interpreted their data in favor of the interoceptive-based concept.
However, I will argue that there are strong arguments which make
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the data rather compatible with what I call the intero-exteroceptive
relational concept of emotional feeling. I argue that there seems to
be a mismatch between empirical data and their interpretation in
current imaging studies on emotional feelings and interoceptive
processing which I want to support by making the three following
points.
First, all paradigms employed did not investigate interocep-
tive stimuli in isolation from exteroceptive stimuli but rather in
relation to them. Critchley et al. (2004), for instance, investigated
heart beat perception in relation to auditory tones as exterocep-
tive stimuli while Pollatos et al. (2005, 2007a,b) directly compared
both conditions with each other. Neural activity changes assumed
to be specific for interoceptive awareness thus reflect a relation
or dynamic balance between intero- and exteroceptive processing
rather than mirroring isolated interoceptive stimulus processing
remaining (more or less) independent of exteroceptive stimulus
processing. Dynamic modulation of the right insula activity as
observed by Critchley may thus reflect a dynamic balance between
intero- and exteroceptive attention in the heartbeat-auditory tone
detection task rather than pure interoceptive heartbeat stimulus
processing. Such intero-exteroceptive relational concept would
thus assume that the above mentioned regions like the right
insula, the SACC/DACC, and the DMPFC are rather respon-
sive to changes in intero-exteroceptive balance than to isolated
interoceptive changes remaining independent of exteroceptive
changes.
Second, neither of the above mentioned studies addressed the
question of emotional valence that indicates whether a feeling is
positive or negative (see also Colombetti, 2005 for a discussion of
the concept of emotional valence). Pollatos et al. (2005, 2007b)
did not observe any significant difference between good and poor
heartbeat perceivers in terms of their emotional valence ratings
while both groups did differ in emotional arousal. Interoceptive
awareness may thus be linked to emotional arousal and subjec-
tive experience of emotional intensity while it apparently does not
seem to determine the valence of the emotional feeling. Regions
that have been associated with emotional valence, as distinguished
from emotional arousal, include the medial orbitofrontal cortex
(MOFC), the subgenual and pregenual anterior cingulate cortex
(PACC), and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC; Craig,
2002, 2009; Phan et al., 2002; Critchley, 2005; Kringelbach, 2005;
Grimm et al., 2006).
Interestingly, these regions are densely and reciprocally con-
nected with the right insula, the SACC/DACC, and the DMPFC
that are supposed to represent the body’s interoceptive state
(Ongur and Price, 2000). The connectivity pattern thus argues
strongly in favor of the intero-exteroceptive relational concept
of emotional feeling which seems to make isolated interocep-
tive processing and thus an interoceptive-based concept of emo-
tional feeling rather unlikely. What however is needed to fur-
ther support this point are investigations of both regional activ-
ity and connectivity patterns during intero- and exteroceptive
stimulus processing (see Hurliman et al., 2005 for some first
support).
Third, Pollatos et al. (2005, 2007b) investigated the temporal
course with EEG during heartbeat perception task. They observed
that good heartbeat perceivers showed higher heart-evoked
potentials and stronger dipole strength in cortical sources that
included the SACC/DACC, the right insula, the DMPFC, and
the secondary somatosenory cortex when compared to poor
heartbeat perceivers. Interestingly, they also observed the dipole
sources in the SACC/DACC and DMPFC to occur earlier (around
280 ms) than the ones in the insula and the somatosensory
cortex (around 370 ms). A similar temporal distribution is sug-
gested by Tsuchiya and Adolphs (2007) who assume involve-
ment of subcortical regions like brain stem nuclei and hypo-
thalamus that mediate interoceptive stimuli to occur after and
later than activation in higher regions like the DMPFC. If the
interoceptive-based model were true, one would rather expect
the opposite temporal pattern with early insula and somatosen-
sory involvement and late SACC/DACC and DMPFC involve-
ment.
Late SACC/DACC and DMPFC involvement may then reflect
some abstract internal cognitive evaluation of interoceptive
stimulus processing with consecutive top-down modulation of
interoceptive brain regions as interpreted by advocates of the
interoceptive-based concept (Craig, 2002, 2009; Tsuchiya and
Adolphs, 2007). What is the role of the SACC/DACC and the
DMPFC? These higher cortical regions have been associated
with processing of higher-order exteroceptive stimuli particularly
those that are highly self-related to the organism (Northoff and
Bermpohl, 2004; Northoff et al., 2006).
The fact that these regions are apparently implicated from early
on in interoceptive awareness gives some though indirect support
to the assumption that exteroceptive stimuli are involved early
in interoceptive processing. Such early involvement indicates that
the role of exteroceptive stimulus processing goes beyond mere
modulation of interoceptive processing which would be better
compatible with late involvement. In other terms, early involve-
ment of these regions may indicate that interoceptive stimulus
processing is coded in relation to exteroceptive stimuli going
beyond mere modulation of the former by the latter. The observed
early spatio-temporal pattern may thus reflect neural coding of the
relationship between intero- and exteroceptive stimulus process-
ing, i.e., their actual balance. Otherwise there would be no need
for regions predominantly associated with exteroceptive stimu-
lus processing to be implicated so early. While it seems to be
less compatible with the assumption of primarily independent
interoceptive processing that becomes secondarily modulated by
exteroceptive stimuli.
Finally, direct empirical support for intero-exteroceptive con-
vergence comes from a recent study by Farb et al. (2012). He
investigated interoceptive awareness (i.e., attention to breath-
ing rate) and exteroceptive awareness (i.e., visual attention) in
the same subjects. While both intero- and exteroceptive aware-
ness yielded dissociable networks (i.e., visual cortex and pos-
terior insula), they overlapped in especially the anterior insula.
Unlike the posterior insula that responded strongly to intero-
ceptive awareness, the anterior insula activity was as much pre-
dicted by exteroceptive awareness as interoceptive awareness.
Hence, there seems to be intero-exteroceptive convergence in
especially the anterior insula with both being integrated in the
middle insula as bridge from posterior to anterior parts of the
insula.
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EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS: CONNECTIVITY AND CODING
ANATOMICAL CONNECTIVITY AND INTERO-EXTEROCEPTIVE
CONVERGENCE
The MOFC and the VMPFC have been demonstrated to be impli-
cated in interoceptive processing. Using biofeedback arousal and
relaxation tasks in fMRI, Nagai et al. (2004) demonstrated that
resting state activity in the VMPFC and MOFC co-varied with the
basal level of sympathetic skin conductance. While regions like
the SACC/DACC, the insula, and the hypothalamus were related
to the rate of change in skin conductance. The level of neural
activity in VMPFC and MOFC, which are part of the so-called
anterior cortical midline structures (aCMS), may thus represent
the basal sympathetic or autonomic tone independent of some
actual stimuli. Since the aCMS have been shown to be modulated
also by exteroceptive stimuli, neural activity within these regions
may mirror a dynamic balance between attention to extero- and
interoceptive stimuli (see also Nagai et al., 2004). This assump-
tion is well compatible with the connectivity pattern of these
regions.
The MOFC and VMPFC as the entrance door to the aCMS
receive connections from all regions associated with primary
and/or secondary exteroceptive sensory modalities (olfactory, gus-
tatory, somatosensory, auditory, and visual; see Rolls et al., 1999;
Barbas, 2000; Rolls, 2000; Damasio, 2003, 2010; Kringelbach and
Rolls, 2004). The aCMS are also densely connected to regions
(insula, hypothalamus, and nuclei in the brain stem as such
PAG, colliculi, etc.) processing interoceptive sensory signals; these
include the proprioceptive and vestibular senses, the visceral sense,
and the sense of the interoceptive milieu which can be taken
together with that of pain and temperature (Carmichael and
Price, 1996; Price, 1999; Rolls et al., 1999; Rolls, 2000; Dama-
sio, 2003, 2010; Barbas, 2004; Kringelbach and Rolls, 2004). The
aCMS, especially the MOFC, VMPFC and SACC/DACC, are also
connected to regions associated with distinct functional domains
including motor (premotor and motor cortex, basal ganglia), cog-
nitive (lateral prefrontal cortex), and emotional (amygdala, brain
stem) domains (Carmichael and Price, 1996; Rolls et al., 1999;
Barbas, 2000; Ongur and Price, 2000; Rolls, 2000; Kringelbach and
Rolls, 2004). Due to such extensive intero- and exteroceptive con-
nections, the MOFC and VMPFC (and, in conjunction with the
amygdala) can be characterized as polymodal convergence zone
(Rolls et al., 1999; Rolls, 2000; LeDoux, 2002; Schore, 2003).
This connectivity pattern predisposes the aCMS for neural pro-
cessing irrespective of the sensory modality of the respective stim-
ulus, i.e., supramodal processing. The assumption of supramodal
processing in aCMS is supported by results from imaging stud-
ies. Emotions in either exteroceptive modality (visual, auditory,
gustatory, olfactory) induce neural activity in various regions of
the aCMS (see above as well as Phan et al., 2002; Northoff and
Bermpohl, 2004). Moreover, processing of interoceptive stimuli
induces also activation in aCMS regions like MOFC, VMPFC,
and ACC (Craig, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2009; Wicker et al., 2003;
Critchley et al., 2004; Nagai et al., 2004). Finally, stimuli from
different origins, i.e., of different sensory modalities or of different
functional domains (motor, emotional, cognitive, and sensory)
induced analogous activation in aCMS (Northoff and Bermpohl,
2004; Northoff et al., 2006).
Taken together, both connectivity pattern and imaging data
suggest that neural processing in aCMS is supramodal and
domain-independent: what apparently matters for inducing
neural activity in the aCMS is not so much the modality or
domain, i.e., the origin of the stimulus, as either intero- or exte-
roceptive or cognitive, motor, sensory, or emotional. Instead it is
important how the neural activity in the aCMS is related to the
respective intero- or exteroceptive stimulus (see below for further
discussion).
In addition to the aCMS, subcortical midline regions like the
periaquaeductal gray (PAG), the colliculi, the dorsomedial thala-
mus, and the ventral striatum may also be considered in processing
interoceptive stimuli in relation to exteroceptive ones. Panksepp
(1998; and also Damasio, 1999, 2010), for instance, assumes that
these regions are crucial in constituting emotional feelings. Since
the very same regions are also characterized by strong motor con-
nections both afferent and efferent, he and others like Ellis (2005;
unlike Damasio who assumes a sensory-based view of feelings)
assume emotional feeling to be motor-based. This is well com-
patible with Panksepp’s characterization of emotional feeling as
reaching-out to the environment thus reflecting what I called the
relational concept of emotional feeling.
Unfortunately, subcortical regions have often been neglected
in imaging studies of emotions which, at least in part, may be
due to the fact that neural activity in these regions is rather
difficult to reliably visualize in current imaging techniques like
fMRI. However, animal experiments demonstrate the crucial role
of these subcortical midline regions in constituting emotional feel-
ings (Panksepp, 1998, 2005). Future studies in humans are thus
needed to investigate subcortical neural activity during emotional
feeling in order to bridge the current gap between animals and
humans. Furthermore, the relationship between emotional feel-
ing and motor function also needs to be investigated in detail
by, for instance, investigating emotional feeling in dependence on
variation of motor function and its neural underpinnings (and
vice versa).
TRANSLATIONAL VERSUS RELATIONAL CODING
What is the implicit presupposition that drives most of the above
cited authors to interpret their data in favor of the James–Lange
theory? They seem to presuppose a clear-cut distinction between
intero- and exteroceptive stimulus processing with both systems
being separate, distinct, and only interacting at specific node
points. According to such view, exteroceptive stimuli are trans-
lated into interoceptive stimulus processing whose perception, in
turn, is supposed to induce feeling. Exteroceptive stimuli thus have
at best an only indirect and mediated impact on emotional feeling
in that they must first be translated into interoceptive stimulus
processing before they can modulate feelings. I therefore call this
model the interoceptive-based translational concept of feeling.
Since exteroceptive stimuli have only an indirect and mediated,
the interoceptive-based translational concept attributes no con-
stitutive role of exteroceptive stimuli and the environment thus
presupposing an “embodied” concept of emotional feeling.
However,anatomical connectivity suggests otherwise. Through-
out the brain at all levels both subcortical and cortical and
especially in the subcortical-cortical midline system there is
Frontiers in Psychology | Emotion Science August 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 303 | 4
Northoff Emotion and consciousness
convergence between intero- and exteroceptive inputs. This is
especially true for regions like the colliculi, the PAG, the tectum,
and the aCMS where both intero- and exteroceptive afferences
converge onto common neurons (see Panksepp, 1998, 2005; Rolls
et al., 1999). This suggests that interoceptive stimuli are not only
modulated by exteroceptive stimuli at specific node points but
rather that the relation, e.g., the degree of convergence and diver-
gence, between intero- and exteroceptive stimuli is coded in neural
activity in the subcortical-cortical midline regions. Exteroceptive
stimuli are not translated into interoceptive stimulus processing
but rather directly and unmediated related to them and it is this
relation that seems to be coded in neural activity. I therefore call
this model the intero-exteroceptive-based relational concept of
feelings (see also Figure 1).
Is there any empirical evidence in favor of the intero-
exteroceptive relational model of neural coding? Critchley (2005,
p. 162), one of the main investigators of interoceptive processing
in imaging, states, that the“right insula maps bodily arousal states”
and “it does so contextually” which therefore “represents an inte-
gration of external emotional information with peripheral states
of arousal” (Critchley, 2005, p. 759). What seems to be coded in
the brain is not so much the interoceptive stimulus itself but its
relation to the respective exteroceptive stimulus. If neural activity
codes the actual relationship and balance between intero- and exte-
roceptive stimuli, one would expect strong contextual dependence
of emotional feelings.
The constitution of the emotional feeling, the type of feeling,
should then depend on the respective emotional context which
implies that different contexts may lead to different types of
emotional feelings even in identical situations. In other terms,
the environmental context does not only modulate emotional
feelings but actively participates in constituting emotional feelings.
This is well in accordance with the Schacter/Singer experiments
where different contexts resulted in different types of emotional
feelings. If the role of the context were merely modulatory, sub-
jects would not have shown completely different and opposing
emotional feelings in the two situations but rather variants of
the same feeling. These experiments thus lend further support
to the assumption of a constitutive role of the environmen-
tal context in emotional feelings (rather than remaining merely
modulatory).
How are intero- and exteroceptive stimuli related and bal-
anced with each other in relational coding? Rather than coding the
intero- or exteroceptive stimulus itself, the degree of correspon-
dence between intero- and exteroceptive stimuli is coded. If, for
instance a lion approaches, the heart rate may increase, which may
signal strong correspondence and convergence between intero-
and exteroceptive stimuli. This consecutively leads to the consti-
tution of a corresponding emotional feeling, the feeling of fright
and anxiety. If, in contrast, the approach of the lion is not accom-
panied by heart rate increases, as for instance if one is not clear
whether the lion is real or not, there may be a mismatch between
intero- and exteroceptive stimuli. This may result in a different
emotional feeling, the feeling of doubt and hesitation. The degree
of convergence and divergence between intero- and exteroceptive
stimuli may thus determine the kind of emotional feeling. That is
well in accordance with the relational concept rather than with the
translational one that claims for an interoceptive- and thus bodily
based approach.
Taken together, I assume that our brain’s design is such
that there is no way for interoceptive stimuli other than to be
processed in relation to exteroceptive stimuli and vice versa.
FIGURE 1 |The figure compares two different ways of neural coding in
emotional feeling. On the left side translational coding describes how
intero- and exteroceptive stimuli are separately represented and
meta-represented in the neural activity of the brain. This
meta-representation is then perceived which following Damasio and the
James–Lange theory leads to emotional feelings. This is different in
relational coding on the right side. Here intero- and exteroceptive stimuli
are coded in relation to each other with this relation resulting in emotional
feeling and subsequent experience of the relationship between body and
environment.
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Interoceptive stimulus processing remaining isolated, unrelated
and independent from exteroceptive stimulus processing is conse-
quently assumed to remain (principally) impossible. This implies
what I call intero-exteroceptive relational coding while it excludes
interoceptive-based translational coding. What does this imply in
experimental regard? The experimental efforts to isolate intero-
ceptive stimulus processing and to search for its specific neural
correlates may be futile since exteroceptive stimulus processing
may always already be implicated in interoceptive stimulus pro-
cessing. One may better focus on experimentally investigating
different intero-exteroceptive stimulus configurations and thus
different constellations between body and environment as nicely
demonstrated in the Schacter/Singer experiments (see Northoff,
2012a for more details on the question of neural coding).
CONCEPTUAL IMPLICATIONS: RELATIONAL APPROACH TO
EMOTIONAL FEELING
RELATIONAL CONCEPT OF EMOTIONAL FEELING
The philosopher Hurley (1998, pp. 10, 341–342, 362–364) distin-
guishes between instrumental and non-instrumental dependence
(see also Colombetti, 2008 who also applies this distinction) with
regard to the relationship between input and output in perceptual
content. If the relationship between input and output is indirect
and thus merely instrumental, changes in perceptual content are
dependent upon changes in the input. Every change in motor out-
put has to modulate sensory input in order to have an impact
on perceptual content implying that the output can not change
independently of the input: “This kind of dependence of per-
ceptual content on output is merely instrumental. It operates via
changes in input; changes in output are a means to changes in
input” (Hurley, 1998, p. 10).
What does this mean with regard to emotional feelings and their
relation to the environment? Presupposing instrumental depen-
dence, the environment can impact emotional feelings only indi-
rectly via the body, i.e., by being represented either in the body’s
sensorimotor (and vegetative) functions or in those brain regions
that register the body’s sensorimotor (and vegetative) functions.
The latter approach is, for instance, advocated by the propo-
nents of Damasio’s theory of emotional feeling where the relation
between body and environment remains at best modulatory (and
contributing but not as constitutive). This is nicely reflected in
a quote from a recent paper about emotion and consciousness:
“Here, we follow the common view that emotion and conscious-
ness emerge as a result of neuronal activity in the brain, but some
accounts view emotions or consciousness as relationships between
an organism and its environment (here we acknowledge such rela-
tionships as contributing but not as constitutive)” (Tsuchiya and
Adolphs, 2007, p. 159; see also Bechara and Naqvi, 2004).
Non-instrumental dependence, in contrast, is described by
Hurley as direct dependence of perceptual content on motor
output independent of sensory input; even if the sensory input
remains the same and fixed,perceptual content can vary depending
on motor output. This means that motor output has direct access
to perceptual content independent of sensory input and therefore
no longer operates indirectly via sensory input as in instrumental
dependence; instead, perceptual content may vary in orientation
on motor output independent of sensory input and thus directly.
What does such non-instrumental or constitutional, as I will
call it in the following (see also Colombetti, 2008), dependence
imply for the relationship between body and environment in
emotional feeling? If the relationship between emotional feel-
ing and environment is direct and therefore constitutional, i.e.,
non-instrumental, changes in the environment should be able to
impact and constitute emotional feelings independently of the
body’s sensorimotor representation. The environment itself may
then directly involved in constituting emotional feelings. Thereby,
the concept of environment is meant here in a social sense, social
environment, as distinguished from the merely physical world (or
physical environment).
This has empirically been paradigmatically exemplified in a
recent study on reward (Fliessbach et al., 2007). Two subjects a and
b were simultaneously scanned while receiving rewards. While the
reward for the subject a was fixed, the one for subject b was varied;
this and the converse case, increasing rewards for subject a and
fixed rewards for subject b, allowed to investigate its impact of the
environment, i.e., subject b, on subject a. Interestingly, emotional
feelings and neural activity in reward circuitry in subject a did not
so much depend on the size of the reward it received but rather on
the relation of or balance to its own reward when compared to the
one received by subject b. If, for instance, subject a received 60$
and subject b only 30$, subject a showed happiness and increased
reward circuitry activation. If, in contrast, subject b received 120$
with subject a still receiving 60$, subject a no longer showed hap-
piness and increased neural activity in reward circuitry. Though
sensorimotor input was exactly the same for subject a in both cases
(only subject’s b reward amount changed), playing the same game
and receiving the same reward, emotional feelings, and neural
activity in reward circuitry differed in dependence on the amount
of reward subject b received when compared to the amount subject
a received.
This means that, to put it into conceptual terms, emotional feel-
ings and neural activity in subject a were not merely instrumentally
dependent upon the social environment (since then changes in
subject b could have impact subject a only if they had changed
subject’s a reward) but rather instrumentally or constitutionally.
More specifically, it is the relationship between person and (social)
environment, the actual difference or balance between subjects’ a
and b rewards, that seemed to determine emotional feelings and
neural activity. It is such constitutional, i.e., non-instrumental,
dependence of emotional feelings on the social environment
and its relationship to the person that I will characterize as the
relational concept of emotional feelings2. Such intrinsic linkage
between emotional feelings and the social environment is empiri-
cally further supported by the observed overlap between emotion
processing and social processing (like social intentions; see Cia-
ramidaro et al., 2007) in especially aCMS like the anterior cingulate
2The here advanced relational concept may be considered an extension of the
embodied approach by Colombetti and Thompson, who also emphasize the sit-
uated, extended and thus embedded nature of emotional feeling. Since the main
focus here is on the neurophilosophical aspect, I cannot go into the philosophical
details about the relational approach (see below for the discussion of some philo-
sophical implications and Northoff, 2004 for a general outline). See also Ben-Ze’ev
(1993, 81–99) who advocates a relational approach to perception and, in some part,
also to emotion (see Ben-Ze’ev, 2000)
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cortex and the DMPFC (see Schilbach et al., 2012). These (and
other) data end strong support to an intrinsically social and thus
relational concept of emotional feeling.
EMBEDDED APPROACH TO EMOTIONAL FEELING
The relational approach shifts the focus of attention from the
body, as in the embodied approach, to the role of the environ-
ment in emotional feelings. Rather than modulating emotional
feelings indirectly via bodily representations, the environment is
supposed to be involved directly in constituting emotional feel-
ings. How does the person-environment relation account for
the variety of different specific emotional feelings? The lack of
specificity concerning distinct emotions has often been criti-
cized in feeling theories like the James–Lange theory (see also
Niedenthal et al., 2005). Autonomic bodily changes like arousal
are rather unspecific reactions that do not allow to distinguish
between distinct emotions. This criticism has been furnished
by the Schachter and Singer (1962) experiments demonstrat-
ing that subjects with autonomous nervous system stimulation,
as induced by epinephrine, experienced the resulting arousal as
either anger or euphoria in dependence on the respective con-
text (they were placed in a room with either an angry or happy
actor).
The conclusion is often drawn that physiological bodily changes
and arousal themselves remain unspecific and cannot contribute
to determine specific emotions); determination and distinction of
specific feelings can consequently not be based upon physiologi-
cal bodily changes but must be found elsewhere. This argument
of the lack of specificity of bodily representations has been coun-
tered in different ways by referring to motor, cognitive, or neural
representation. Zajonc (1998, 2000), for instance, claims that
the motor system allows for extremely subtle distinctions which
means that even a number of limited bodily states can support
a very large number of representational distinctions of distinct
emotional feelings. Rather than referring to motor capacities, cog-
nitive theories, e.g., appraisal theories (Solomon, 2004; and also
Schachter and Singer, 1962) resort to cognitive representations
and higher-order cortical brain functions which may allow for a
much more fine-grained distinction between different emotional
feelings.
Damasio (1999, 2003, 2010) suggested a middle way between
motor and cognitive representation. He focuses on those sub-
cortical brain regions that register physiological bodily states
which may allow for a wider representational spectrum than
the muscles and viscera themselves that are actually repre-
sented in the respective neural states. All these approaches have
in common that they still presuppose representation of emo-
tional feelings in motor, cognitive, or neural-subcortical func-
tions.
The relational approach, in contrast, claims that the wide
variety of different emotional feelings may ultimately be traced
back to the relation between person and environment rather
than to motor, cognitive, or neural-subcortical representation.
Since an abundant variety of different person-environment rela-
tions are possible, different emotional feelings can be con-
stituted. The question for the specificity of emotional feel-
ings is thus traced back to the possible (and impossible)
person-environment relations rather than to the representa-
tional capacities of specific functions, i.e., motor, cognitive, or
physiological-registering.
If emotional feelings are intrinsically relational, i.e., depending
upon the person-environment relation rather than some repre-
sentational capacities in motor, cognitive, or neural-subcortical
function, one would expect different feelings to reflect differ-
ent kinds of person-environment relationships. Ratcliffe (2005,
2008) does indeed assume exactly this and assumes what, rely-
ing on Heidegger’s phenomenology, he calls “existential feelings.”
“Existential feelings” include feelings of homeliness, belonging,
separation, unfamiliarity, power, control, being part of some-
thing, being at one with nature, and “being there.” These feelings
have in common that they describe “ways of finding ourselves
in the world” which metaphorically circumscribes what I called
the person-environment relation. What Ratcliffe calls existential
feeling presupposes what I here advance as relational concept of
emotional feeling. How does the person and thus the subject come
into play in emotional feelings? This will be the focus in the next
sections.
EMPIRICAL DATA: INTRINSIC ACTIVITY AND EMOTIONAL
FEELING
EMOTIONS AND RESTING STATE
I so far focused on the relationship between intero- and exterocep-
tive stimulus processing in emotional feeling. Neurobiologically
this was supposed to be related to the anatomical convergence
between the respective pathways and the kind of coding, i.e., rela-
tional coding rather than translational coding. While conceptually
this implied a shift from the embodied concept of emotional feel-
ing to a relational concept (or as the philosophers may want to
say an extended concept). This pointed out the intrinsic relation
to emotional feelings to the environment as bridge between body
and environment.
What remains unclear though are two aspects: why are emo-
tional feelings not objective but rather subjective as manifest in an
emotional experience? And why are emotional feelings affective
and thus emotional? Taking a purely logical stance one could well
imagine mere feelings without any emotions. Both questions dent
deeply in various domains of research including consciousness
(see Northoff, 2012a,b) which though I will avoid here to keep
matters simple. I will here focus only on some neurobiological
mechanisms while leaving the philosophical implications open. In
order to shed some light on these questions, I turn to recent results
about the relation between resting state activity and emotions.
A recent study by Sreenivas et al. (2012) investigated different
emotional faces (sad, happy, neutral) in fMRI and focused thereby
predominantly on the midline regions of the default-mode net-
work (DMN). They demonstrated that sad faces induced a higher
degree of deactivation, i.e., negative signal changes in the VMPFC,
the PCC, and the precuneus when compared to happy faces. In
contrast, activation and thus positive emotional signal changes
were observed in the lateral fronto-parietal regions (except in left
middle frontal gyrus). Finally, functional connectivity pattern also
differed between sad and happy emotions for the connections
between the midline and the lateral regions with VMPFC, PCC,
and precuneus being central nodes.
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While this study demonstrates that emotions are associated
with midline regions that show high resting state activity, it leaves
open whether that is related to intero- or exteroceptive stim-
uli. This was tested for by a study by Wiebking et al. (2011)
from our group. Subjects had to perform the above mentioned
intero-exteroceptive awareness with long resting state intervals
(8–13 s) in-between. These served to subtract both intero- and
exteroceptive signal changes from the resting state which, as
expected, yielded higher activity changes in the midline regions.
We then determined the degree of deactivation during both
intero- and exteroceptive awareness. That yielded stronger deacti-
vation in exteroceptive awareness when compared to interoceptive
awareness.
How is all that related to emotions? For that Wiebking et al.
(2011) included psychological measures of emotions (i.e., the
Florida Affect battery and the Beck Hopelessness scale) and corre-
lated them with the signal changes in the midline regions dur-
ing the different conditions. Interestingly, we did not observe
any correlation of the emotion measures with the midline sig-
nal changes during interoceptive awareness alone. Instead, the
emotion measures significantly correlated with especially sig-
nal changes in VMPFC, DMPFC, and PCC during rest and
exteroceptive awareness: The stronger the emotion score, the
smaller the degree of deactivation in the midline regions thus being
closer to the resting state activity level. In contrast, no correlation
was observed with signal changes during interoceptive awareness.
Hence, these results underline the central importance of intrinsic
and thus resting state activity for emotions.
MODULATION OF RESTING STATE BY EMOTIONS
These results show the strong association between resting state
activity and emotions. They though leave open whether emotions
can also modulate resting state activity or whether the latter pre-
dict the former. Several recent studies demonstrated the prediction
of stimulus-induced activity by the preceding resting state activity
implying rest-stimulus interaction (see Northoff et al., 2010 for
a review). This was mainly shown in the in the sensory domain
while, as to my knowledge, such studies are not yet available in the
domain of emotions. There are though a couple of studies that
show the reverse, modulation of resting state activity by preceding
emotions.
Focusing on emotions, Eryilmaz et al. (2011) investigated the
impact of fearful, joyful, and neutral movie clips (50 s presenta-
tion) on subsequent resting state activity (90 s eyes closed). They
asked the participants after the resting state period about their
thoughts. This revealed that the subjects’ personal relevant issues
in their thoughts were increased after neutral movies, less increased
after joyful movies,and significantly decreased after fearful movies.
These results show a clear behavioral or better psychological effect
of emotions on the thought contents in subsequent resting state
periods; fearful movies seem to leave apparently the strongest
traces in the subsequent resting state’s thought contents.
Neuronally, they showed that the resting state periods after fear-
ful faces showed higher neuronal activity in subcortical regions
(pallidum, anterior thalamus, hypothalamus) than the ones fol-
lowing neutral movies (rest after fearful larger than rest after
neutral). Most interestingly, the reverse comparison (rest after
neutral larger rest after fearful) revealed higher signal changes in
various regions of the DMN (VMPFC, PACC, DMPFC, STG).
This means that the inclusion of fearful emotions in the preceding
movie had a clear effect on the level of subsequent resting state
activity. The stronger resting state effects of the preceding emo-
tional movies are further confirmed by the more delayed recovery
of the signal changes during the resting state period (90 s) after
emotional movies.
This study clearly demonstrates that emotions have an impact
on the subsequent resting state thus implying what we coined
as stimulus-rest interaction (see Northoff et al., 2010). This was
also observed in another study. Veer et al. (2011) investigated a
psychological stress task in healthy subjects and scanned them in
their resting state one hour later in fMRI. This revealed increased
functional connectivity from the amygdala to the cortical mid-
line structures like the MPFC, the PCC, and the precuneus. This
indicates that psychological stress implicating strong and nega-
tive emotions can affect the subsequent resting state activity thus
implying stimulus-rest interaction.
Taken together, these studies demonstrate the close relation-
ship between resting state activity and emotion-related activity.
This seems to be especially apparent in the midline regions as core
nucleus of the DMN. The high intrinsic activity in these regions
seems to be closely related to emotion processing in though yet
unclear ways. Different emotions seem to modulate the degree of
stimulus-related deviation from the high resting state activity in
different ways. The close relationship between emotions and rest-
ing state is further supported albeit indirectly by the observation
of severe resting state alterations in major depressive disorder (see
Alcaro et al., 2010; Northoff et al., 2011; for recent overviews).
EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS: INTRINSIC ACTIVITY AND THE
SUBJECTIVE NATURE OF EMOTIONAL FEELING
In order to better understand the potential role of the brain’s
intrinsic activity in emotional feeling, we need to go back to the
psychological level. For that I turn to two of the major proponents
of emotional feeling, Jaak Panksepp and Jim Russell, and how they
conceptualize especially the subjective-experiential component of
emotional feeling. This will be then linked in subsequent sections
to the above described findings of the close relationship between
intrinsic activity and emotions.
PANKSEPP AND RUSSELL ON EMOTIONAL FEELING
Based on the centrality of affect and emotions, Panksepp (1998,
2010) developed a neuroscientifically based theory of primary
process affects as raw emotional feelings which he associates with
evolutionary ingrained subcortical circuits. Russell (2003) shifted
from an earlier Psychological Construction Theory of emotions
to the assumption of what he calls “Core Affect” as a basic and
foundational unit (or building block) of any specific emotional
feeling. While Panksepp’s concept of “primary process affect”over-
laps at least conceptually (and also to some degree empirically)
with Russell’s concept of Core Affect (see especially Russell’s p.
6–7 commentary on Panksepp), they are not the same.
Panksepp distinguishes between three distinct kinds of primary
process affects, homeostatic, sensory, and emotional. Homeostatic
affect provides information about the body and thus interoceptive
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stimuli, sensory affect is related to exteroceptive stimuli, and
emotional affect is associated with the brain (or BrainMind as
Panksepp says) and hence with what one may call “neural stim-
uli.” These distinctions make it clear that primary process affect
is linked with stimuli generally, and more specifically with stimuli
of different origins, be they of bodily (i.e., interoceptive), envi-
ronmental (i.e., exteroceptive), or neural origin. Hence, primary
process affect must be somehow assigned to stimuli since otherwise
Panksepp could not associate primary process affect with stimuli
of such different origins. I call such association of stimuli with
affect or primary process affect “affective assignment” meaning
that a stimulus of whatever origin can be assigned affect.
Analogous to Panksepp, Russell must also presuppose affec-
tive assignment though in a slightly different way. He does not
associate what he describes as Core Affect itself with a specific
type of stimulus since unlike Panksepp he does not speak of sen-
sory, homeostatic, or emotional Core Affect. Instead, Core Affect
is continuously present independent of the presence or absence of
particular stimuli. One though has to mention that Russell seems
to refer here only to the absence of exteroceptive stimuli since he
does not explicitly talk about interoceptive or even neural stimuli
in this context. This means that it cannot be excluded that Core
Affect may be related to the assignment of affect to either neural
or interoceptive stimuli. Hence Russell’s concept of Core Affect
would then also presuppose what I call affective assignment.
Rather than to interoceptive stimuli, Russell explicitly refers to
the assignment of affect to exteroceptive stimuli when he describes
the transition from Core Affect to emotional episodes and emo-
tional meta-experience. In the moment when the continuously
present Core Affect is related to an episodically occurring extero-
ceptive stimulus, an emotional episode and meta-experience may
occur. This however is possible only if the Core Affect is linked
and thus assigned to the exteroceptive stimulus thus presupposing
what I here call affective assignment.
While both Panksepp and Russell seem to presuppose the
assignment of affect to stimuli, the exact functional mechanisms
that enable and predispose such affective assignment remain
unclear in their accounts. What functional mechanisms are neces-
sary to enable and predispose the transformation of a non-affective
stimulus into an affective one? I call this the “non-affective-
affective transformation.” The “non-affective-affective transfor-
mation” raises the question how it is possible that a stimulus is
suddenly associated with either Core Affect or primary process
affect. It is especially worthwhile to consider that the stimulus
of interoceptive, exteroceptive, or neural origin must be non-
affective. Hence“non-affective-affective transformation”raises the
question: what kind of functional mechanisms and neural input
the brain must provide in order to assign affect to the stimulus.
The question about the “non-affective-affective transforma-
tion” raises another issue. Both Panksepp and Russell consider
affect to be essentially subjective rather than objective. Panksepp
refers to primary process affect as subjective by describing it as
an “internal experience” while Russell describes Core Affect as
subjective in the sense of a private experience. Hence, Panksepp
distinguishes internal from external and Russell private from pub-
lic when they characterize Core Affect or primary process affect
as subjective rather than objective. One should need to make a
conceptual remark here. The meaning of the term subjective refers
here only to the experience of affect, it does not say anything about
the underlying neuronal mechanisms that may well be objective.
This raises the question how affective assignment makes it
possible to transform the originally objective stimulus, interocep-
tive, exteroceptive, or neural, into a subjective one. Hence, “non-
affective-affective transformation” is not limited to transforming
a non-affective into an affective stimuli but with transforming the
objective into a subjective stimulus. I therefore speak of “objective-
subjective transformation.”“Objective-subjective transformation”
raises the following question: how do the neuronal mechanisms
enable the transformation of an objective stimulus into a subjective
one? Such that, in conjunction with “non-affective-affective trans-
formation” the stimulus can be subjectively and thus internally
and privately experienced.
“OBJECTIVE-SUBJECTIVE TRANSFORMATION”
Both Russell and Panksepp seem to presuppose some kind of
intrinsic stimuli to be crucial in generating affect. Russell does
so by explicitly distinguishing Core Affect from extrinsic stimuli
and related emotional episodes, while Panksepp argues that neural
activity in the subcortical circuits is not dependent upon extrinsic
stimuli, i.e., exteroceptive stimuli. This means that both must pre-
suppose some kind of intrinsic activity for the generation of affect
(Figure 2).
What could such intrinsic activity be? One may assume it is
that activity that can be observed in the absence of any extrin-
sic stimulation by either intero- or exteroceptive stimuli. Intrinsic
means then that the origin of that activity must be traced back
to the brain itself as distinguished from body and environment.
One may refine such intrinsic activity as the brain’s resting state
activity, or that activity in the brain in the absence of any intero-
and exteroceptive stimuli (see Northoff et al., 2010). And it is such
resting state activity as intrinsic activity that can be observed in all
brain regions cortical and subcortical (see Northoff et al., 2010).
The fact that resting state activity is present throughout the
whole brain means that there may already be some neural interac-
tions between the different brain regions within the resting state
itself. For instance the resting state activity level in the sensory
cortex may interact with the resting state activity level in the
subcortical regions so that one may want to speak of rest–rest
interaction. The above described results lend clear empirical sup-
port to the assumption that such resting state activity in especially
the midline regions is central for emotions and most likely for
emotional feelings.
And there is further interaction. As soon as an inter- or exte-
roceptive stimulus enters the brain it interacts with the brain’s
resting state activity level thus yielding what can be called rest-
stimulus interaction (Northoff et al., 2010). Such rest-stimulus
interaction may be specified according to the stimulus type either
rest-interceptive stimulus interaction or rest-exteroceptive stimu-
lus interaction (which in the following I will describe as rest-intero
and rest-extero interaction).
How do the three types of interaction, rest–rest, rest-intero,
and rest-extero relate to affective assignment and more specif-
ically to the non-affective-affective transformation and the
objective-subjective transformation? The resting state activity level
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FIGURE 2 |The figure shows the relationship between intrinsic activity
and stimuli (on the left) and emotional feeling (on the right). The intrinsic
activity of the brain interacts with the stimuli that are by themselves
non-affective and objective. That rest-stimulus interaction leads to the
assignment of affect and subjectivity to the stimulus resulting in emotional
feeling.
is different not only between different regions but even more
importantly, different between different persons. This means that
the same stimulus encounters a different brain in different per-
sons meaning it must interaction with a different resting state
activity level. Rest-stimulus interaction individualizes the stimu-
lus and adapts its processing according to an individual brain’s
resting state activity level. Due to the individual resting state activ-
ity level and its impact on rest-stimulus interaction, the stimulus
is processed in a very individual and ultimately private way.
By individualizing and privatizing the stimuli with respect to
the brain’s actual resting state activity level, the originally objective
stimulus is transformed into a subjective one. Hence what I called
above objective-subjective transformation may correspond on a
functional level to rest-stimulus interaction. Any processing of the
stimulus, interoceptive or exteroceptive, in relation to the brain’s
resting state activity level (and hence its neural stimuli) may pri-
vatize and individualize the stimuli, and thereby transform it from
an objective to a subjective one.
Russell and Panksepp may now want to argue that this accounts
only for half of the story. Panksepp may say that this leaves
emotional affects as based on the stimuli from the BrainMind
itself and hence its neural stimuli out; this may be so because
rest-stimulus interaction concerns only the interaction with
intero- and exteroceptive stimuli. Hence, my assumption of rest-
stimulus interaction corresponding to objective-subjective trans-
formation may well account for what Panksepp calls homeostatic
affects and sensory affects, but not emotional affects.
Russell may want to make an even stronger point. My assump-
tion of rest-stimulus interaction misses Core Affect altogether
because Core Affect is neither related to interoceptive nor exte-
roceptive stimuli. Instead the core affect precedes both kind
of stimuli that becoming relevant only in emotional episodes.
Hence, my assumption that rest-stimulus interaction corresponds
to objective-subjective transformation may hold for emotional
episodes and emotional meta-experience but not for Core Affect
itself.
This however is to neglect that the brain’s resting state can
interact with itself, as for instance the resting state activity level
in the subcortical circuits interacting with cortical regions. There
may thus be what could be called “rest–rest interaction” where the
neural stimuli of one particular region’s resting state may interact
with those of another region. Recent imaging data show that such
rest–rest interactions do indeed occur (see Northoff et al., 2010 for
recent review). In the case of such rest–rest interaction, the resting
state activity level of one network is set against that of another
network.
SUBJECTIVE CHARACTER OF EMOTIONS
This has major implications for the conceptual characterization
of emotions. Any stimulus, internal, external, or neural, cannot
avoid but to interact with the brain’s resting state activity. If that
very same resting state activity individualizes and privatizes stim-
uli and their encoding into neural activity, any emotions must
be individualized and privatized. That though means that any
emotions must necessarily be subjective meaning that it cannot
avoid objective-subjective transformation. There is consequently
no emotion without emotional feeling with the latter being at the
very core of the former. This nicely corresponds to what Russell
describes as“Core affect”and Panksepp as“primary process affect”
and, more generally as “BrainMind.”
To empirically support this assumption, future studies are
needed to test whether the preceding level of resting state activity
predicts the degree of especially the subjective-experiential com-
ponent of emotions, i.e., the emotional feeling. I would hypothe-
size that the preceding resting state activity predicts especially the
subjective-experiential component of emotions. While other com-
ponents like the vegetative and the cognitive aspects of emotions
may rather be predicted by the degree of stimulus-induced activity
itself.
One may finally raise the question how the here suggested role
of the resting state in objective-subjective transformation stands
to the above proposed relational coding. I would argue that both
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are well compatible. While above I focused on the relation between
intero- and exteroceptive stimuli, I now extend the focus to include
the brain’s intrinsic activity and thus its neural stimuli into the
equation of relational coding.
Let me be more specific. The incoming stimulus must be coded
in relation to the intrinsic activity level and thus relative to it. The
resulting neural activity must then be considered the integral of
their interaction, i.e., rest-stimulus interaction, rather than being
related to the stimulus alone. That though is possible only if neural
activity is coded in terms of a relation between stimulus and intrin-
sic activity as distinguished from neural coding of the stimulus by
itself. I thus assume rest-stimulus and stimulus-rest interaction
to presuppose relational coding in very much the same way as
the relation between intero- and exteroceptive stimuli is encoded
into neural activity (see Northoff, 2012a for more details on the
question of neural coding).
“NON-AFFECTIVE-AFFECTIVE TRANSFORMATION”
How about the second feature of affective assignment, that non-
affective-affective transformation? What functional mechanisms
correspond to the transformation of a non-affective stimulus into
an affective one? Panksepp (2010, p. 13) himself gives one hint in
this direction. He considers primary process affect to be intrinsi-
cally valuative (in a wider sense as not being restricted to reward) in
that it mirrors the value of environmental, bodily, and neural infor-
mation for the organism. How can such value be generated, and
what kind of functional mechanisms are necessary in order to value
stimuli of different origin, exteroceptive, interoceptive, or neural?
In order for stimuli of various origins to be valued for the organ-
ism, they must be related to the organism itself, including its body
and brain. More specifically, exteroceptive stimuli from the envi-
ronment need to be related to the brain’s neural stimuli leading to
rest-extero interaction and the body’s interoceptive stimuli lead-
ing to intero-extero interaction. The same holds for interoceptive
stimuli which need to be related to the brain’s neural stimuli thus
requiring rest-intero interaction. Finally, as demonstrated above,
the brain’s resting state activity itself may be valued when rest–rest
interaction occur.
How does affect enter these various interactions? Russell tells
us that Core Affect is continuously present even in the absence
of exteroceptive stimuli. Unlike exteroceptive stimuli which arise
more episodically, there is continuous interoceptive input and thus
continuous rest-intero interaction in the brain. Due to the con-
tinuous presence of the body, continuous interoceptive input and
subsequent continuous rest-intero interaction cannot be avoided.
One may consequently consider rest-intero interaction as one
possible candidate functional mechanism that may correspond to
what Russell describes as Core Affect. It is by the continuous neural
processing of the body’s interoceptive stimuli against the brain’s
neural stimuli that affect may be generated. Hence, interaction of
the interoceptive stimuli with the neural stimuli may transform
the originally non-affective interoceptive stimulus into an affec-
tive one. The hypothesis is thus that rest-intero interaction may
correspond on the functional level to the non-affective-affective
transformation and thus to what Russell described as Core Affect.
However, there is not only Core Affect but also emotional
episodes (Russell) or sensory affect (Panksepp) in relation to
exteroceptive stimuli. How can exteroceptive stimuli be assigned
affect and how can they undergo the non-affective-affective trans-
formation? Very simple. They may be linked to interoceptive stim-
uli resulting in an intero-extero interaction. They would thereby
be valued, which in turn would lead to a non-affective-affective
transformation with the subsequent assignment of affect. Hence,
one may consider the interaction of stimuli of various origins
with specifically interoceptive stimuli from the body as a neces-
sary condition for the non-affective-affective transformation. This
may apply to the brain’s neural stimuli with rest-intero interaction
which then leads to what Russell described as Core Affect and
Panksepp as homeostatic affect. It may also apply to exterocep-
tive stimuli with intero-extero interaction that may then result in
what Russell characterized as emotional episodes and Panksepp as
sensory affect.
DISSOCIATION BETWEEN SUBJECTIVITY AND AFFECTIVITY
One may now be puzzled. I characterized objective-subjective
transformation by the interaction of any kind of stimulus with
the brain’s resting state activity, i.e., its neural stimuli, so that any
kind of rest-stimulus interaction will do the job. And I considered
the interaction of any stimulus with interoceptive stimuli from the
body as being necessary for the non-affective-affective transforma-
tion. Hence, both transformations, objective-subjective and non-
affective-affective are characterized by interactions with different
stimuli, the brain’s neural stimuli and the body’s interoceptive
stimuli.
As on a psychological level where affectivity and subjectivity
co-occur, non-affective-affective, and objective-subjective trans-
formations also co-occur in the“normal”case. There is interaction
with the body’s interoceptive stimuli (e.g., intero-extero interac-
tion), and there is interaction with the brain’s resting state and thus
its neural stimuli (e.g., rest-intero and rest-extero interaction).
This means that affectivity and subjectivity are co-constituted,
which is reflected in both Panksepp and Russell definitions of
affect by.
If one interaction takes over at the expense of the respective
other, the co-constitution between affectivity and subjectivity may
become dysbalanced. This is, for instance, the case in schizophre-
nia where rest-intero and rest-extero interactions may be reduced
leading to an abnormal loss of subjectivity (Northoff and Qin,
2011). There is thus still non-affective-affective transformation
while the objective-subjective transformation seems to fail: These
patients thus still experience emotional feelings while their respec-
tive contents are no longer experienced as subjective but objective.
While the reverse seems to be the case in depression, where
rest-intero interaction seems to predominate over intero-extero
interaction (Alcaro et al., 2010; Northoff et al., 2011). In the most
extreme case, depressed patients say that they no longer feel any
emotion, the feeling of non-feeling. Hence, non-affective-affective
transformation may be blocked while at the same time this state
is experienced as highly subjective implying objective-subjective
transformation. The cases of depression and schizophrenia thus
indicate the possibility of dissociation between both forms of
transformation.
Interoceptive processing and consecutively intero-extero inter-
action may also be altered or disrupted in alexithymia that
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concerns the inability to identify and describe emotional feeling.
The exteroceptive stimuli and their respective contents can then
no longer be associated with emotional feelings: While the con-
tents are experienced as subjective (due to functioning rest-intero
and rest-extero interactions), they are not assigned emotional feel-
ing (due to deficient intero-extero interaction). Empirically this is
supported by a recent study that shows the degree of interoceptive
awareness to predict the degree of alexithymia with high intero-
ceptive awareness going along with a low degree of alexithymia
(Herbert et al., 2011).
CONCEPTUAL IMPLICATIONS: EMOTIONAL FEELING AND
CONSCIOUSNESS
RELATIONAL APPROACH TO EMOTIONAL FEELING
How should emotional feelings be conceptualized on the basis
of the intero-exteroceptive relational model of neural coding?
What we subjectively experience as emotional feeling is thus not
so much mere perception of an interoceptive stimulus like the
heartbeat perception but rather the relation between intero- and
exteroceptive stimulus processing relative to our brain’s intrin-
sic activity. Emotional feelings can no longer be determined in
an interoceptive-based way as perceptions of physiological body
changes. Instead, emotional feelings may better be described in
an neural-intero-exteroceptive relational way thus focusing more
on the relation between brain, body and environment than on
either the body or the environment itself3. What is constitutive
of emotional feelings is thus the relation between brain, body,
and environment so that feelings reflect the respective person’s
relationship to the world.
This is paradigmatically reflected in what the philosopher Rat-
cliffe (2005, 2008) calls existential feelings. Based on Heidegger, he
describes existential feelings as feelings that characterize our rela-
tion to the world, i.e., as ways of “finding ourselves in the world.”
This is also pointed out by Solomon (2004, pp. 77–78, 84) in a more
recent writing when he claims for “an existential notion of emo-
tions”which he considers to be“subjective engagements within the
world4.”For instance, different existential feelings characterize dif-
ferent relations to the world like feelings of homeliness, separation,
belonging, power, control, etc. Most important, emotional feelings
like anger, grief, etc. presuppose existential feelings so that both
emotional and existential feelings can be characterized as rela-
tional. If so, the body itself may only be considered the medium
through which feelings can be constituted. Feelings are the relation
between person/body and environment rather than some percep-
tion of either bodily or environmental changes; in other terms,
feelings are this relation implying that this relationship is felt.
3This is well compatible with the relational approach to meaning and personal
significance as suggested by Ben-Ze’ev (1993, 2000) that undercuts the traditional
assumption that higher-order cognitive functions are necessary to give meaning and
personal significance to otherwise meaningless and personally insignificant sense
data.
4One may off course argue that we can have subjective experience without emotion
in for instance so-called “cold” cognitions. “Cold” cognitions may however be con-
sidered just as an extreme case on a continuum in the relationship between emotion
and cognition where feelings may still be involved in the background though being
maximally suppressed.
Due to the very basic and foundational character of the brain-
body-environment relation, the relational concept considers emo-
tional (and existential) feelings basic and primary for emotions,
i.e., feelings are then the “core nucleus” of emotions. This is very
much in line with the neuroscientific approach by Panksepp (1998,
2005) who assumes what he calls “primary affective conscious-
ness.” He regards “primary affective consciousness” as basic and
crucial for all forms of subjective experience and thus for con-
sciousness in general. Analogously, the relational view considers
our relation to the world primary, basic and crucial to our subjec-
tive experience or, as Ratcliffe would probably say, the relation is
existential.
NEURO-PHENOMENAL APPROACH TO EMOTIONAL FEELING
Since the relational concept characterizes the brain-body-
environment as basic, primary, and constitutive of feelings, the
here advanced relational concept of emotional feelings seems to
complement the empirical approach by Panksepp in conceptual
regard. Feelings and thus affective consciousness can only be pri-
mary and basic, as Panksepp claims, because they are our relation
to the world. Another complementary point is Panksepp’s (and
other authors like M. Sheets-Johnstone, N. Humphrey and R.
Ellis) insistence on the close linkage between motor function
and emotional feeling, i.e., the primary motor basis of affective
consciousness.
In contrast to Damasio (2010), who opts for a rather sensory-
based view of emotional feeling, Panksepp (and others like Ellis,
2005) argues for a primary“motor view”of affective consciousness
and emotional feeling because all presumably involved subcortical
regions like the PAG, the colliculi, etc. show strong connections
to the motor system receiving motor afferences from and send-
ing out motor efferences to other cortical and subcortical regions.
Accordingly, Panksepp (and others like Ellis, 2005) claims that
there is intrinsic linkage between motor action and emotional
feeling resulting in what may be described as “I act, therefore I
feel.” The assumption of motor underpinnings as being crucial to
emotional feeling is well compatible with the relational concept.
The here suggested relational approach also needs to be distin-
guished from cognitive approaches. Cognitive approaches focus
on the awareness and thus reflection of emotional and cogni-
tive contents thus presupposing access or reflective consciousness,
the awareness of subjective experience. For that various cognitive
functions are assumed to be necessary. This is different in the rela-
tional approach that focus on phenomenal consciousness and thus
on subjective experience itself and how it is generated and trans-
formed into a phenomenal state (see below) on the basis of the
brain’s neuronal states.
The relational approach can thus be characterized as “neuro-
phenomenal approach” rather than “neuro-cognitive approach”
(see Northoff, 2012b). Since the cognition, i.e., awareness and
reflection, of subjective experience and its contents presup-
poses its generation, I assume the “neuro-phenomenal approach”
to be more basic and prior to the neuro-cognitive approach.
Future studies may therefore want to investigate how the
here described neuronal processes of non-affective-affective and
objective-subjective transformation impact cognitive functions
and their respective neural substrates.
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FIGURE 3 |The figure shows the relationship between emotional
feeling and phenomenal consciousness. By interacting with the
brain’s intrinsic activity via relational coding affect and subjectivity is
assigned to the intero- and exteroceptive stimuli. This in turn makes
possible the generation of emotional feeling and phenomenal
consciousness.
EMOTIONS AND CONSCIOUSNESS
How is the transformation of the brain’s neuronal states into the
phenomenal states of consciousness possible? The relational con-
cept presupposes bilaterally dependent and constitutive linkage
between brain, body, and environment. Mere linkage by sensory
function would result in unilateral and rather instrumental linkage
where the person/body cannot directly impact the environment.
It is only by motor function that the person/body becomes intrin-
sically anchored in and non-instrumentally, i.e., constitutionally
linked to the environment. In other terms, motor function must
be considered the empirical means by means of which what I
conceptually described as relational becomes possible. Panksepp’s
insistence on motor underpinnings of emotional feelings may
thus be considered complementary to the here advanced relational
concept of emotional feeling (Figure 3).
Once emotional feelings are considered to be the core nucleus
of both emotions and consciousness, the often made distinction
between “having an emotion” and “feeling an emotion” becomes
no longer applicable. Following Bennett and Hacker (2003, pp.
210–214), there is no principal distinction between “having an
emotion” and “feeling an emotion” since, as Kripke (1972) already
pointed out, the having of pain is to be identified with the feel-
ing of pain. Either we have pain and subjectively experience or
feel pain or we do not feel any pain and then we have no pain.
“Having an emotion” is consequently to be identified with “feel-
ing an emotion” and their distinction remaining untenable and
implausible.
According to Bennett and Hacker (2003, p. 214), the main
difference should better be drawn between “feeling an emotion,”
as being identical with “having an emotion,” and “realizing what
emotion one feels.”“Feeling an emotion” might then indicate sub-
jective experience and thus what currently is called phenomenal
consciousness (see below for further explication). In contrast,
“realizing what emotion one feels” might be considered to impli-
cate higher-order cognitive functions and thus be associated with
what has been called reflective consciousness.
By considering feeling as constitutive of emotion and phenom-
enal consciousness, the relational concept of emotional feeling
argues against the explanation of feelings in terms of higher-order
cognitive and reflective functions mirroring what is called reflec-
tive consciousness. Roughly, reflective consciousness describes the
person’s awareness that it has subjective experience and thus phe-
nomenal consciousness – reflective consciousness may thus focus
on higher-order cognitive functions.
Phenomenal consciousness, in contrast, does not describe cog-
nitive and behavioral aspects associated with subjective experience.
Instead, it focuses on the subjective-experiential aspect itself that
is described as the “phenomenal aspect” (Chalmers, 1995; Block,
1996). A number of alternative terms and phrases pick out approx-
imately the same core property of phenomenal consciousness.
These include “qualia,”“phenomenology,”“subjective experience,”
and “what it is like” which, despite subtle differences, we here con-
sider to describe the same phenomenon for pragmatic purposes. I
characterize emotional feeling by “qualia” and “what it is like” thus
presupposing phenomenal consciousness.
The here proposed relational account is well in accordance with
Peter Goldie’s approach who emphasizes the phenomenal, e.g.,
unreflective, qualitative, and“what it is like”character of emotional
feeling (Goldie, 2000, pp. 68–69). Goldie (2000, pp. 1–2, 41) argues
that the phenomenal character of feelings is due to the involve-
ment of a point of view, a perspective, by means of which they
become “fundamentally personal.” The relational concept claims
that such personal point of view is established by constituting the
relationship between brain, body, and environment and thus by
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constituting feelings be they existential or emotional. How such
personal point can be established by relating brain and body to
the environment remains to be discussed in detail which how-
ever is beyond the scope of this paper (see Northoff, 2004, 2012b;
Northoff and Bermpohl, 2004; Northoff et al., 2006).
Finally, the here proposed neuronal mechanisms underlying
especially the subjective nature of emotions may be relevant for
consciousness in general. The yet to be specified and defined
neuronal mechanisms underlying rest-stimulus interaction are
assumed to be central for the subjective component. If so they must
be regarded necessary of consciousness in general that is essentially
defined as subjective. Even if not sufficient by themselves as neural
correlates of consciousness (NCC), specific yet unknown ways of
rest-stimulus interaction must then be regarded a necessary or
predisposing condition of consciousness. One may consequently
want to speak of neural predispositions of consciousness (NPC)
as distinguished from the NCC (see Northoff, 2012b).
CONCLUSION
The often favored James–Lange theory and many current neu-
roscientific approaches that consider feeling as mere perception
of bodily changes and thus as “embodied” may be extended by
considering the crucial role of the environment in directly con-
stituting emotional feelings. I therefore suggested in this paper
to complement the embodied concept of emotional feelings by a
relational concept that assumes emotional feelings to be consti-
tuted by the brain-body-environment relationship. The relational
concept assumes that the environment and the brain itself have
not only instrumental and thus indirect impact on emotional feel-
ings via the body but also a direct, e.g., non-instrumental and thus
constitutional role in constituting emotional feelings.
The present paper focuses on whether such relational con-
cept of emotional feelings is compatible with current empirical
data on the neuroscience of emotion processing. If the relational
concept of emotional feeling is empirically plausible, even inte-
roceptive awareness should implicate brain regions that process
exteroceptive stimuli. Both, e.g., intero- and exteroceptive brain
regions, should then also be closely linked to each other in terms
of anatomical, i.e., structural and functional connectivity.
Human brain imaging data show strong involvement of the
VMPFC and other aCMS in emotional feelings. These regions can
be characterized by strong convergence between intero- and exte-
roceptive inputs as well as of both with the brain’s high intrinsic
activity, its resting state activity. This presupposes what I describe
as the neural-intero-exteroceptive relational mode of neural cod-
ing rather than interoceptive-based translational neural coding
(see also Northoff, 2012a). In short I assume relational coding to
be the predominant neural code that allows to link emotions to
brain, body, and environment. Emotions and emotional feelings
may then be considered, metaphorically speaking, the bridge or
glue between brain, body, and environment.
The intrinsic linkage between brain, body, and environment
accounts for the subjective and affective nature of emotional feel-
ings. By being processed in the brain relative to its intrinsic activity
(at least in the human brain as it is designed) emotions cannot
avoid becoming subjective and affective. The subjective and affec-
tive components must therefore be regarded intrinsic to and thus
defining features of emotions. As such emotions and emotional
feeling may be considered paradigmatic cases of consciousness
in general which in the current neuroscientific and philosophical
debate is rather often neglected (see also Northoff, 2012b).
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APPENDIX
GLOSSARIUM
Coding: Formal measure according to which stimuli are encoded
into neural activity.
Consciousness: Subjective experience characterized by “what
it is like” and a point of view. Referring here mainly to phe-
nomenal consciousness as distinguished from access or reflective
consciousness.
Embeddedness: Constitutional (as distinguished from mere
modulatory) dependence of consciousness and emotional feeling
on the (social) environment.
Embodiment: Constitutional (as distinguished from mere
modulatory) dependence of consciousness and emotional feeling
on the body and its sensorimotor functions.
Exteroceptive stimuli: Input into the brain from the environ-
ment.
Interoceptive stimuli: Input into the brain from the own body.
Neural stimuli: Input into the brain from other regions and
time points within the brain itself.
Non-affective-affective transformation: Processes that underlie
the assignment of affect to a primarily non-affective stimulus that
thereby becomes transformed into an affective stimulus.
Objective-subjective transformation: Processes that underlie
the assignment of subjectivity to a primarily objective stimulus
that thereby becomes transformed into a subjective stimulus.
Relational coding: Coding of different stimuli in relation to
each other into neural activity in the brain.
Resting state: The state of the brain in the absence of any spe-
cific stimulus from outside the brain as from the body or the
environment.
Rest–rest interaction: Changes in neural activity in the resting
state. These changes may occur between different regions and/or
across time as fluctuations in the spontaneous activity of the brain.
Rest-extero interaction: Interaction of the brain’s resting state
activity with exteroceptive stimuli from the environment.
FIGURE A1 |The figure illustrates schematically the relevant midline
regions in the cortex. The image is a sagittal slice of the brain take in its
midline. MOPFC, medial orbitofrontal cortex; VMPFC, ventromedial
prefrontal cortex; DMPFC, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex; PACC, perigenual
anterior cingulate cortex; SACC, supragenual anterior cingulate cortex; PCC,
posterior cingulate cortex; RSC, retrosplenial cortex; MPC, medial parietal
cortex.
Rest-intero interaction: Interaction of the brain’s resting state
activity with interoceptive stimuli from the own body.
Rest-stimulus interaction: Term for the interaction of intero-
ceptive and/or exteroceptive stimuli with the brain’s resting state
activity.
Translational coding: Coding of each stimulus by itself into
neural activity in the brain with subsequent translation of the
different neural activities into each other.
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